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SYMPOSIUM
UNDERCOVER NEWSGATHERING TECHNIQUES:
ISSUES AND CONCERNS*
TAINTED SOURCES: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
JOURNALISTIC WRONGS
Robert M. O'Neil'
The issue of news organizations' potential liability for their newsgathering
practices has garnered significant attention in several recent cases. Robert M.
O'Neil discusses several such cases which have focused on the balance between the
First Amendment interests at stake and the improper or possibly illegal manner in
which the media obtained its information. The author concludes by suggesting
principles to guide in balancing these interests.
INTRODUCTION
Just after CBS withdrew a scheduled 60 Minutes segment about tobacco
industry practices because the network feared legal liability, two pre-eminent
First Amendment litigators offered diametrically opposed views on the with-
drawal. The issue was whether the network could have been held civilly
* The following five articles were written in conjunction with a symposium held on
February 22, 1996 at the Annenberg Washington Program, Washington, D.C., sponsored
by the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, and
with generous assistance from the Annenberg Washington Program. The symposium
was moderated by Professor Rodney A. Smolla. Symposium panelists included: Sandra
Baron, Executive Director of the Libel Defense Resource Center; Ellen Hume,
Executive Director of the PBS Democracy Project; Jane Kirtley, Executive Director of
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; Robert O'Neil, Professor of Law
and University Professor, University of Virginia, and Director of the Thomas Jefferson
Center for Protection of Free Expression; David Page, ABC News Investigative
Reporter; and John Walsh, Partner with the New York office of the law firm
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. The symposium explored the legal and ethical
implications of new techniques in newsgathering, and aggressive new litigation efforts
employed against the media in connection with such newsgathering.
"" Professor of Law and University Professor, University of Virginia; Director,
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression.
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liable for inducing a tobacco executive to breach a contract with his former
employer not to disclose confidential information about the cigarette making
process. For P. Cameron DeVore, the network's outside counsel on such
matters, CBS's action was sound; Supreme Court decisions offered little
promise that "a tort ... [would be] trumped by the First Amendment."' But
for James C. Goodale, who had counseled the New York Times through the
Pentagon Papers crisis,2 "that explanation doesn't wash."3 As he read the
case, "no news organization has ever been sued for what it published solely
on a claim of inducing breach of contract... [because] the First Amend-
ment prevents it."4
With all deference, neither view fully reflects the complexity of the
issue or the uncertainty of the precedents. Indeed, it might not be unfair to
suggest that one of the experts is right for the wrong reasons, while the
other may be wrong for the right reasons. Before examining the cases on
which both DeVore and Goodale relied, the 60 Minutes matter should be
placed in a larger context. To some degree, such variant views reflect a
different focus: optimists tend to find comfort in the strong First Amend-
ment protection that courts have conferred upon publication, while pessi-
mists are discouraged by the absence of comparable protection for
newsgathering. The problem is that the most difficult cases currently involve
both gathering and disseminating news, a duality that blurs the application
of the clear principles that surround each activity. The truth, therefore, may
lie somewhere between the two extremes.
Another factor helps to reconcile divergent views about the appropriate
level of constitutional protection. In a half-dozen recent instances, the status
of highly visible media stories has been affected by the legality or propriety
of conduct involved in obtaining the key information. At the heart of the
dispute between Messrs. DeVore and Goodale, among others, is an issue
that needs much more attention than it has received: How far does
newsgathering conduct shape the dimensions of First Amendment protection
for media use of that information? It may be helpful to review current
events before revisiting the legal context.
Almost forgotten among recent cases was the final chapter in the five-
year battle between Panamanian General Manuel Noriega and CNN.5 In De-
cember 1994, CNN apologized profusely-as a federal district judge de-
manded-for having aired portions of an interview between Noriega and his
lawyer.6 Although the primary basis for the sanction was the breach of a
P. Cameron DeVore, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A30.
2 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
James C. Goodale, "60 Minutes" v. CBS and Vice Versa, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 1995,
at 3.
4Id.
' CNN v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
6 CNN Is Sentenced for Tapes and Makes Public Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
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judge's order, the means by which the interview had been obtained, as well
as the potential effect of its airing on Noriega's right to a fair trial, entered
the equation.7 In fact, the Noriega case represents a clear break with a line
of cases that refused to uphold gags on pre-trial publication of potentially
harmful material
Later that same year came ABC's curious apology to Philip Morris for
statements the network had broadcast during a Day One expos6 of the ciga-
rette manufacturing process.9 Although ABC lawyers concluded that the
accusation of "spiking" cigarettes with nicotine for addictive purposes was
fully defensible, other forces took over and led to the much-criticized apolo-
gy.'
0
The Philip Morris settlement did not end all such problems for ABC.
Very much alive, though dormant, is a running dispute with Food Lion over
news gathering methods." In 1992, the network broadcast a Prime Time
Live segment about Food Lion's marketing practices. 2 The most damaging
material came from footage shot in a Food Lion store by an ABC staff
member who used an assumed name to obtain employment. 3 Although it
never sought to enjoin the broadcast, Food Lion has sued for darrlages on
several grounds. 4
Later, there was the effort to prevent Business Week from publishing
material potentially damaging to the parties in a suit over financial losses
from use of derivatives. Procter and Gamble had sued Bankers Trust for
various alleged breaches. Through a friend (who was a member of the
bank's New York law firm), a Business Week reporter obtained materials
about the case that had been obtained originally through pre-trial discov-
ery. 15 Although the lawyer did not realize it at the time, some of those ma-
1994, at B7.
7 Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1549-50.
s See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); United States v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974).
9 See ABC and Tobacco: The Anatomy of a Network News Mistake, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 1996, at Al.
10 Id.
"' Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995);
see also Elizabeth Jensen, ABC Fights Lawsuit by Food Lion Involving Newsgathering
Methods, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1995, at B6.
12 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 816.
13 Id. at 814-16.
Id. at 812 (alleging state tort violations of, inter alia, intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, negligent supervision, trespass, and breach of fiduciary duty stemming
from ABC's undercover investigation).
" Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 190 (S.D. Ohio
1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Milo Geyelin, Leaky Credibility:
Big Law Firm's Gaffe over Sealed Records Raises Troubling Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct.
4, 1995, at Al; Linda Himelstein, The Story Behind the Bankers Trust Story, Bus. WK.,
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terials had been sealed, and thus should not have been divulged without
court permission. 6 The trial judge initially enjoined Business Week from
publication,"7 but, after Business Week's unsuccessful pleas to the Sixth
Circuit and the Supreme Court," eventually lifted the order.19 Business
Week was thus free to, and did, make extensive use of the materials, but
only after the judge had chided its editors for what he deemed the "unlaw-
ful" nature of its newsgathering.2° The Sixth Circuit, some months after the
curb had been lifted, held the district court's ban on publication to be a
prior restraint in clear violation of the First Amendment because it "pre-
vent[ed] a news organization from publishing information in its possession
on a matter of public concern."'"
The trial judge was not alone in faulting Business Week's conduct. Jus-
tice Stevens, who as a Circuit Justice had refused to stay the restraint, added
that, in his view, "the manner in which [Business Week] came into posses-
sion of the information it seeks to publish may have a bearing on its right to
do so."22 This dictum was relatively unimportant to the immediate dispute.
It is, however, highly significant to the larger issue that is our focus. Here
we have a conscientious interpreter of the First Amendment expressing his
view that the nature of newsgathering conduct may affect courts' power to
restrain publication of material that is truthful and is of obvious public inter-
est and concern.
I. DOES NEWSGATHERING CONDUCT REALLY MATrER?
Justice Stevens's comment brings us to the heart of a critical First
Amendment issue. It is an issue on which the courts have, in fact, given
considerable guidance, though much of it by inference and indirection. We
might divide the cases into three groups-those where First Amendment
protection is so clear that conduct apparently does not matter;23 those at the
other extreme where First Amendment interests are insufficient, regardless
Oct. 2, 1995, at 58.
16 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 190-91.
17 Id. at 188.
"8 McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (Stevens, Circuit Jus-
tice 1995).
19 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 193.
20 Id.
21 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
22 McGraw-Hill, 116 S. Ct. at 7.
' See generally Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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of conduct; 4 and a third, potentially most helpful, group of cases where
conduct seems critical to the scope of First Amendment rights.'
First, the classic example of a "conduct doesn't matter" case is that of
New York Times Co. v. United States,' commonly known as the Pentagon
Papers case. In Pentagon Papers, the United States government sought to
enjoin publication of stolen government documents that explored the United
States's involvement in Vietnam.27 The fact that the critical documents
were stolen did not matter at all to the Supreme Court's majority, so clear
was the First Amendment's abhorrence of prior restraint.' Even the dis-
senters made little of the means by which Daniel Ellsberg had obtained the
papers: Chief Justice Burger spoke at one point of the New York Times's
"unauthorized possession,"29 but rested his dissent much more on what he
saw as the unseemly haste on the Court's part in deciding the case rather
than unseemly behavior by the newspaper.3"
Another example of "conduct doesn't matter" comes from related quar-
ters. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia3 involved the publication
of "confidential" information about an inquiry into judicial misconduct. By
definition, the media were not supposed to have so sensitive a report. Yet,
once the media had obtained the report, even Chief Justice Burger was clear
that no restraint was appropriate because "the publication Virginia seeks to
punish ... lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the
Commonwealth's interests ... are insufficient to justify the actual and po-
tential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press ... ,32 Al-
though neither side made much of the way in which the report had been
obtained, the opinion strongly implied that however egregious the media
conduct might have been, direct sanctions or tighter security offered the
only constitutionally acceptable means of control.33
A third kind of case that fits the "conduct doesn't matter" rubric are
those dealing with pre-trial publicity-at least until CNN v. Noriega.' Ne-
2 See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Snepp v. Unit-
ed States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Publishing Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1977).
' See generally Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
27 For a more detailed discussion of the case, see John C. Sims, Triangulating the
Boundaries of Pentagon Papers, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341 (1993).
2 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714-15.
29 Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
I d. at 751-52 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
32 Id. at 838.
33 Id. at 841.
34 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
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braska Press Association v. Stewart35 remains the classic case. In striking
down the gag order that Nebraska courts had imposed to protect the fairness
of a highly visible trial, many factors entered the equation. The key to inval-
idating such a decree was the trial judge's failure to assess the efficacy of
various alternatives, such as change of venue, sequestration, rigorous voir
dire, and detailed instructions, all of which might have tempered the risk of
publicity without gagging the media.36 The case did not address the propri-
ety of the media's conduct; apparently the reporters were entitled to be pres-
ent when the potentially damaging evidence came out.
Indeed, Nebraska Press and other pre-trial publicity cases strongly sug-
gest that if improper newsgathering methods were the sole basis for seeking
a restraint, the constitutionally preferable remedy would be direct sanctions
against the offenders rather than denial of the tainted information to the
public.37 On that theory, even Noriega may be consistent; although clearly
there was some concern about the network's newsgathering methods, the
trial judge's paramount concern was possible harm to the fairness of the
trial-and to the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship--from the broad-
casting of conversations between a defendant and his attorney. 38
From cases that seem clearly on the protective side, we turn to a differ-
ent group of cases in which conduct may be equally irrelevant, though for
the opposite reason-cases where even blameless behavior would not ab-
solve the media. Those who claim that the truth should always justify pub-
lishing material of public interest must contend with several troublesome
precedents.
First, there is the intriguing case of Hugo Zacchini, the human cannon-
ball who recovered damages from a television station that broadcast without
permission his entire fifteen-second act that it had filmed at an Ohio county
fair'.39 The Court held that the station had misappropriated Zacchini's valu-
able property.4" Although the camera crew's entry to the site was not au-
thorized by the performer, there was no suggestion of trespass; the fair's
management apparently had acquiesced.4 This judgment, therefore, stands
alone in its curious resolution of a dispute between the right to publish
truthful information of public interest on the one hand, and a claim of legal
protection for intangible interests that are not covered by copyright, trade-
mark, or unfair competition, on the other.42 Given the consistent reluctance
of courts to impose liability for truthful publications that invade privacy,43
35 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
36 Id. at 562-69.
3" See id. at 568-70.
38 See id. at 568-69.
31 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Publishing Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
40 Id. at 575-78.
41 Id. at 563-64.
42 Id. at 573.
43 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
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even if resulting in grave harm, Zacchini seems something of an aberration.
Nevertheless, it is alive and well as a precedent," and one that surely qual-
ifies the media's right to disseminate the truth.
One other type of case that seems to fit this rubric involves the tension
between the right to publish and breach of contract. In Snepp v. United
States,45 a case that time largely has overlooked, a former CIA employee
was unanimously held to be bound by his pre-employment agreement not to
publish anything about certain facets of his job, and to publish nothing with-
out agency clearance.46 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, sus-
tained the agency's position, largely on national security grounds, but with-
out applying anything close to a clear and present danger standard.47 Justic-
es Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan agreed that Snepp had "breached his
duty" and thus was culpable.4" They demurred only on the issue of reme-
dies, arguing that imposing a constructive trust was too drastic a remedy.49
Such issues as the accuracy of the material Snepp proposed to include in his
book, or whether any rules had been broken in the process of obtaining it,
were simply not considered legally significant.
Snepp should have better prepared court commentators for the Supreme
Court's 1991 ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co." In Cohen, a media
source, who had been promised confidentiality in return for a politically
explosive interview, sought and recovered substantial damages for breach of
contract when his name appeared on the front pages of the St. Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune." Because the state
contract principle of promissory estoppel was one of "general applicability,"
its application to the media abridged no First Amendment interests--even
though, when the dust settled, a newspaper had to pay large damages for
publishing a truthful statement of obvious public interest that it had obtained
by seemingly lawful means. 2 Four dissenters argued that a defense of
truth, reinforced by public interest, ought to avail in such a situation.53 The
374 (1966).
See, e.g., International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.,
789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that property rights can be protected with-
out violating the First Amendment), affd, 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Tacynec v. City of
Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding entertainment as a form of protected
speech), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983).
4 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
46 Id. at 514-16.
47 Id.
, Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
41 Id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
-' 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
s id. at 666.
52 Id. at 669-72.
51 See id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun & O'Connor,
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majority rejoined that "[t]he First Amendment does not grant the press such
limitless protection. 5
4
Although this factor apparently did not shape the outcome, Cohen re-
turns to the issue of conduct. Although there was certainly nothing unlawful
about the newsgathering activity at issue-no theft, torture, bribery, or coer-
cion-the majority was not ready to give its imprimatur to the newspaper's
conduct. Because the newspaper "obtained Cohen's name only by making a
promise that they did not honor," there was some doubt whether the media
conduct deserved the accolade "lawful. 55 So brief a reference offers at
most a hint that the Cohen majority saw the matter of newsgathering con-
duct as potentially relevant to resolving a close case, even where that con-
duct could surely not be called "unlawful" in any conventional sense.
We come now to a third group of cases, where media conduct is not
only relevant to First Amendment protection, but may be dispositive. Four
times, the Supreme Court has addressed the tension between publishing
truthful information and such state-protected interests as the anonymity of
sexual assault victims. 6 Each time the First Amendment claim has pre-
vailed. 7 In such cases, however, the Court has firmly resisted invitations to
recognize an absolute defense of truth. 8 Instead, the Court has found three
essential conditions to have been satisfied in each case: that the information
was accurate; that it had public interest; and that it had been lawfully ob-
tained.5 1 What happens if the media defendant fails to meet these condi-
tions remains unclear. The Court's cautious, case-by-case approach certainly
implies that failure to satisfy any of these desiderata would alter the balance,
and quite possibly the outcome.
The crucial issue is, of course, conduct. In the most recent of these cas-
es, Florida Star v. B.J.F.,6° the Court absolved a newspaper of civil lia-
bility for publishing the name of a sexual assault victim in violation of
Florida law. The source of the information was less pure than in the earlier
cases because it came from a police report prepared before a suspect had
been identified, rather than from open court records.6" That difference,
however, did not fail the "lawfully obtained" test. The Court went to some
11.).
14 Id. at 671.
55 Id.
16 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
5' See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 526; Cox Broadcasting Co., 420 U.S. at 485-
87.
58 See, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671-72.
5 See, e.g, Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-37.
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
61 Id. at 527.
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length to describe the rationale for requiring that the material, even if truth-
ful and of public interest, be lawfully obtained:
To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the
government may under some circumstances forbid its
nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the
[earlier cases'] principle the publication of any information
so acquired. To the extent sensitive information is in the
government's custody, it has even greater power to forestall
or mitigate injury caused by its release. The government may
classify certain information . ... Where information is en-
trusted to the government, a less drastic means than punish-
ing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding
against the dissemination of private facts.62
This passage suggests that although government may not punish or even
enjoin publication of truthful information that has been lawfully obtained,
the trade-off is that government retains substantial latitude in defining what
constitutes "unlawful" for these purposes. This leaves open the question of
what kinds of state law violations might warrant imposing liability for media
transgressions committed in pursuit of truthful material. In fact, the majority
also left open the very policy issue that underlay this case-whether states
can grant redress to rape victims through confidentiality laws more precise
than the Florida statute.63 Thus, the concluding caution in Florida
Star-"our holding today is limited"6-was no mere rhetorical twist. Any
doubt about whether media conduct matters in this context should now be
put to rest.
In fact, it was already clear that newsgathering did not absolve journal-
ists from direct liability for damages caused by aggressive pursuit of infor-
mation. If a reporter tramples a flower bed, breaks a window, or assaults a
person in pursuit of a story, no court in the country would entertain a First
Amendment defense to a suit for direct damages. The journalistic goal
would, in fact, be irrelevant to most such claims. That much was clear be-
fore the recent round of more complex First Amendment litigation.
Another Supreme Court case may belong in this category, although
"conduct" does not quite capture the Court's rationale for limiting the right
to publish the truth in that instance. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,65 the
Court sustained a ban on publication of sensitive information that the media
defendant had obtained from the plaintiff through pre-trial discovery. The
62 Id. at 534.
63 Id. at 540.
6 Id.
65 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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trial court's discovery decree was accompanied by a protective order barring
out-of-court use of the resulting material.66 The newspaper challenged the
protective order, asserting a First Amendment right to print truthful informa-
tion of clear public interest.67 In rejecting that claim, the Court insisted that
this was not a "classic prior restraint," but simply a condition needed to
ensure the smooth and fair functioning of the discovery process.6" The or-
der applied only to information that the media/party had obtained through
discovery; it did not bar use of that same information if it were obtained by
means other than discovery. Yet the media anxiety that greeted Seattle
Times was clearly warranted, for it added another situation in which truth no
longer afforded a media defense.
Ostensibly, Seattle Times had nothing to do with "media conduct." v
Because the case was heard before there was even a threat to publish, much
less actual publication, the Court had no occasion to assess the editors' be-
havior.71 Yet the judgment may have content implications: Like the news-
paper in Cohen, the Seattle Times obtained sensitive information by means
that would be deemed "lawful" only if it continued to respect the constraints
accompanying the initial access to the information.72 When the Minneapolis
Star breached its pledge by blowing Cohen's cover, a process that had been
undeniably lawful up to that point was somehow made "unlawful." The
conduct would have remained lawful if the source had never been named.
Similarly, the Seattle Times would, by publishing, have transformed from
lawful to unlawful the process by which it obtained its information about its
adversary, the information which was presumably accessible only through
court-compelled discovery.
One more recent case supports our analysis of "conduct," although it
involves a non-media defendant. It is one of remarkably few invasion-of-
privacy cases to impose liability for a completely truthful disclosure. In Doe
v. City of New York,73 an HIV-positive airline employee in New York was
fired and sought the help of the city's Human Rights Commission.74 The
agency worked out a settlement with the airline that secured reinstatement
and back pay. 5 The Commission then proclaimed its success by issuing a
press release.76 Although the release did not identify the agency's client by
66 Id. at 25.
67 Id. at 30-31.
68 Id. at 33.
69 Id. at 34.
70Id.
71 Id. at 25.
72 See id. at 34.
' 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
74 Id. at 269.
75 Id. at 265.
76 Id.
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name, the client argued in a federal privacy suit that co-workers recognized
him at once, and that he was ostracized as a direct result of the publicity.77
Recognizing a special right of privacy with regard to HIV status, the Second
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit.7" The court also
ruled that the employee had not waived his right to confidential treatment by
seeking the Commission's help-his disclosures were limited to steps the
agency had to take on his behalf, and the agency's use of the information
did not properly extend to public revelations about so sensitive a matter.79
Once again the issue of conduct seems germane. Although the court did
not suggest that the Commission had acted unlawfully, it gave legal signifi-
cance to the agency's having exceeded the implied consent with which the
complainant had revealed his status in order to initiate the redemptive pro-
cess. Normally a truthful disclosure of this sort, even under New York's
unusually broad privacy laws,8" would not occasion liability. Yet Doe is an
unusually compelling case for several reasons. The subject-HIV status-is
uniquely sensitive, the revelation of which is potentially devastating. More-
over, the public use of the information departs substantially both from the
complainant's expectations and the agency's needs; indeed, the only appar-
ent reason for issuing a release was to win favor and support from the city's
gay community. Thus the court's conclusion that liability might be found
approaches the outer edge of the privacy interest.
To put media interests into the picture, suppose that a New York City
daily had used the press release, correctly identified the employee in its
story, and was then sued for invasion of privacy. The conventional answer
would be that truth affords a complete defense, even in New York. It is not
beyond contemplation, however, that a sympathetic court might legally at-
tribute the Commission's transgression to the newspaper. If, for example,
the reporter knew, or should have known, that such a release was unconven-
tional as well as potentially devastating, a basis for liability might be found.
Surely Doe suggests that the disclosure of a non-public person's AIDS/HIV
status presents a uniquely compelling situation.
II. CONDUCT PRINCIPLES APPLIED
This analysis of precedent provides a context for the current debate over
the scope of First Amendment rights to disseminate truthful but possibly
tainted information. Closer examination of several current causes cgl,6bres
should be helpful. In each instance, assume the worst about the newsgather-
"n Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 268-69.
80 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 8 (protecting freedom of speech and press); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS § 50 (Consol. 1982 & Supp. 1994) (ensuring privacy protection).
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ing conduct, and the best about the accuracy and value of the information.
This approach highlights the tension between the clarity of the right to pub-
lish, on the one hand, and the lack of certainty about less than impeccable
newsgathering methods, on the other.
A. 60 Minutes Revisited
For example, consider the CBS 60 Minutes case. As noted, the experts
are split as to whether airing the interview would have been appropriate."
Some seasoned litigators insist that the explosive interview with the tobacco
executive could and should have been aired with impunity.82 Others argue
with equal conviction that such a step by the network would have been fool-
hardy because a suit for inducing a breach of contract certainly would have
been filed, and very likely have been successful. 3
We now have identified plausible support for both views. On the one
hand, there seems never to have been a litigated claim of inducing breach of
contract against a media defendant, much less an actual damage award up-
held by a higher court. On the other hand, it is far less clear after cases like
Cohen that such a suit would have been futile had the CBS broadcast oc-
curred. Such a suit would have had to establish such elements as the exis-
tence of the executive's agreement, the network's knowledge of that agree-
ment, and its design to induce a breach on the executive/source's part. Evi-
dence already published about the case suggests that these requirements
easily could have been met. Indeed, the fact that the network paid the exec-
utive a substantial fee and then promised to indemnify him from possible
liability goes far to satisfy the factual elements of the case.
What, then, of the constitutional dimensions? Had the concern been one
of pre-broadcast restraint, a First Amendment defense almost certainly
would have prevailed; even the ominous Noriega precedent would not come
close to justifying an injunction here to protect purely private economic
interests. Any court would note that such interests properly look to subse-
quent civil suits rather than to injunctive relief.
It is the prospect of those civil suits that poses the dilemma. 60 Minutes
is not exactly like Cohen's promissory estoppel claim. Not all states rec-
ognize a tort claim for inducing a breach of contract.' Those that do so
typically require proof that a defendant "intentionally and improperly" inter-
81 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. The Wigand interview was later
aired, and on March 24, 1996, 60 Minutes aired a similar interview with a senior Philip
Morris executive.
82 See, e.g., Goodale, supra note 3, at 3.
3 See, e.g., DeVore, supra note 1, at A30.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766(b) (1977).
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fered with a contractual commitment. 5 Yet it is not implausible that courts
in such a state might find an actionable inducement in the 60 Minutes saga.
If they did so, the question would then be whether such a basis for liability
would be constitutionally different from the promissory estoppel claim that
the Court allowed in Cohen, despite the obvious effect there is on publish-
ing truthful information of clear public interest. If the issue is only whether,
under Cohen, the legal standard on which liability turns is one of "general
application," then little more need be said. For that reason, pessimists-or
realists-like Cameron DeVore argue that CBS had no choice but to with-
draw from the field because it was virtually certain to lose the battle.
If, however, a more extensive analysis of media conduct is appropriate,
then the outcome might be different. On this basis, optimists like James
Goodale fault CBS for having given up before a fight. In his view, it would
have been "very hard for CBS to lose"; the outcome would likely have been
"a slam dunk win for '60 Minutes. ' ' 's6 The dramatic difference between
these two views has nothing to do with the network's and its reporters' ac-
tions, nor with the agreement between the tobacco company and its errant
executive. The basis of difference is not even whether media conduct in
newsgathering affects the right to publish the information so obtained; both
sides agree that it often does.
Rather, the issue is how far First Amendment analysis includes dimen-
sions of the tort claim on which the suit was based-in this instance, induc-
ing a breach of contract. If, as DeVore has argued, the only issue is whether
the network could be found in a state court to have committed a tort by
getting the tobacco executive to talk in breach of his confidentiality pledge,
then the case is over; it makes little difference whether the inducer is a
broadcaster or a bookie. That is clearly the pessimistic end of the scale.
If, on the other hand, a media defendant sued for tort damages may
develop its position on such questions as motive, employer interests, media
and public interests, social interests, proximity, and relations between the
parties (whether or not competitors, for example), then the chance of avoid-
ing civil liability is greatly enhanced. 7 If a defendant like CBS could pro-
claim itself, and its source, as whistleblowers serving the vital public pur-
pose of exposing corporate malfeasance, then their chances before the courts
improve dramatically. Even proof that a confidentiality agreement existed
between employer and source, and that CBS meant to and did induce the
employee to violate that agreement, would not assure media liability.
These issues undoubtedly would be reachable under state law. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, in recognizing potential liability for inducing a
8 See id.
86 Goodale, supra note 3, at 3.
8 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 766-767.
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breach of contract, identifies these interests as relevant to the determination
of whether liability is appropriate. In that sense, the state law issues would
be much more complex than the relatively cut-and-dried breach of contract
issues in Cohen. Yet the Restatement, by itself, does not give constitutional
stature to such defense-enhancing interests as public interest, proximity,
non-competitive relationship, and the like. The challenge is to get those
issues into the First Amendment analysis. On that prospect, the cases offer a
varied perspective. Cases like Cohen and Zacchini, on the one hand, are not
encouraging, because civil liability seemed to follow without detailed bal-
ancing of the contending state interests and their effect upon press freedoms.
On the other hand, cases like Florida Star offer modest hope; by rejecting
liability for publishing lawfully obtained truthful information of public inter-
est, the Court paid considerable attention to the strength of the underlying
interests. Indeed, in addressing the issue of media conduct, Justice Marshall
specifically assessed the range of options open to a state that wished to
shield the identity of a rape victim.88 Thus, the more hopeful analogy for
CBS and 60 Minutes would be to the confidentiality cases-where not only
the media conduct is relevant to liability, but where the strength of state
interests receives close scrutiny.
There is, of course, another dimension. Even if CBS could have been
sued for inducing a breach, and might have lost the case, fear of possible
liability is not the only issue these cases raise. Jane Kirtley, Executive Di-
rector of the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, laments recent
highly publicized instances of media compromise, observing that "[i]t is a
sad day for the First Amendment when journalists back off from a truthful
story ... because of fears that they might be sued over the way they got the
information."89 Obviously, such judgments reflect, in what seems to be
growing measure, considerations other than journalistic merit. Such non-
legal factors are beyond the scope of this discussion.
B. Business Week: Non-Party Journalist and Discovery
A second recent case involved an actual-though brief-restraint against
publication of truthful information obtained through unusual, though not
unlawful, means. The issue emerged during a civil suit by Procter and Gam-
ble to recover losses that occurred from using derivatives offered by Bank-
ers Trust.9" Business Week had been covering the story closely.9' A re-
88 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537-40.
89 Jane E. Kirtley, Media Cave Despite High Court Support, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4,
1995, at A19. [Editor's Note: Ms. Kirtley also participated in the February 22, 1996
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium. Her related piece may be found at
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1069 (1996)].
' Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
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porter for the magazine contacted a friend in the bank's New York law firm,
seeking specific information about the case.92 The friend obtained the infor-
mation from a colleague in the firm, but only after he had given the infor-
mation to the reporter did it emerge that the material had been sealed by a
now deceased federal judge who had compelled pre-trial discovery under
protective orders. 3
When it became clear that Business Week intended to publish the infor-
mation, both parties asked a new trial judge to issue a restraining order to
protect the conditions of discovery.94 Such an order was entered.9" After
unsuccessful pleas to the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court,96 Business
Week returned to the district court for another hearing.97 After that hearing,
the judge reaffirmed the initial restraint, but at the same time made the
material part of the amended complaint a public record, thus permitting
Business Week, along with everyone else, to publish.9"
The rationale for this novel approach bears analysis. What troubled the
judge most was Business Week's conduct in "continu[ing] to pursue the
sealed information" even though the magazine was "aware of the protective
order in the case." 99 Thus, he 'concluded, "Business Week may not use the
confidential materials that it obtained unlawfully."'" After reviewing the
basis and nature of the original protective order, the judge added that "the
integrity of a court and the entire judicial system requires that its orders be
acknowledged and obeyed."'
0
'
The authority for the district court's conclusion in Procter & Gamble
was the Supreme Court's judgment in Seattle Times, where the Court upheld
a restraining order against a newspaper's use of sealed material that the
newspaper had obtained through discovery in a lawsuit to which it was a
party."° The opinion stressed that the newspaper "gained the information
they wish to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery pro-
vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
9' See, e.g., Paul Dwyer et al., The Lesson from Barings' Straits, Bus. WK., Mar.
13, 1995, at 30; Kelley Holland & Michael Schroeder, A Lingering Black Eye at Bank-
ers Trust, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1992, at 42.
2 Geyelin, supra note 15, at Al.
3 Id.
94 Id.
5 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D. Ohio
1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
96 Id. at 188.
9 McGraw-Hill Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (1995).
9' Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 193.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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cesses."'' 0 3 The Court added: "A litigant has no First Amendment right of
access to information made available only for purposes of trying his
suit."1" Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, recognizing that the
other party's "interests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to
justify this protective order and to overcome the protections afforded free
expression by the First Amendment. '
The trial judge in Procter & Gamble found Seattle Times applicable well
beyond the immediate parties, and necessary to protect the integrity of the
discovery process." The judge may also have been influenced by the way
in which the Business Week reporter obtained the sealed material.1 7 There
was no hint of theft, bribery, coercion, or even misrepresentation-simply a
catastrophic mistake on the part of the lawyer who gave the material to the
reporter."8 Yet the procedure was unusual and improper. As the Wall
Street Journal later reported:
It made no sense. Sealed documents were supposed to be
strictly off-limits, under possible penalty of contempt and
stiff sanctions. Yet [the reporter] had obtained her copy
simply by picking up the phone and calling a friendly source
at Bankers Trust's law firm .... Now, she later testified, she
called her source and told him, "I have learned this docu-
ment is sealed." On the other end of the phone line, she
testified, came the reply: "Oh, s. '1 9
The accommodating lawyer had erroneously assumed that the documents
were public. Perhaps the circumstances tell us only that Business Week
should not have obtained the material in the first place, and that some repri-
sal surely would follow within the law firm. Nevertheless, clearly no laws
were violated, nor would any civil recourse lie against Business Week or its
reporter. Suppose, however, a far worse situation had occurred, such as the
documents being obtained through theft, bribery, or misrepresentation. That
issue surely deserves attention. First, Seattle Times and the restraining order
need to be addressed in more detail.
103 Id. at 32.
104 Id.
"" Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
106 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 192 (S.D. Ohio
1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
117 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. The district court judge also cited
"dubious" testimony and "disingenuous[]" actions on the part of Business Week employ-
ees. Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 189, 191.
10' Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp.. at 190-91.
109 Geyelin, supra note 15, at Al.
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The application of Seattle Times to such a case as this is simply mis-
guided. The order the Supreme Court sustained in Seattle Times may have
been warranted to limit a party's use of material obtained through discovery
solely for purposes of litigation. If such protection could not be assured,
within the discovery process, courts would be reluctant to order disclosure
of highly sensitive materials and parties would be even more reluctant to
divulge those materials if secrecy could not be assured. The Seattle Times
decision, and even more clearly the Brennan-Marshall concurrence, reflected
that precise and limited rationale. Repeatedly the Court stressed the inter-
party nature of the restraint.'" To extend the reach of Seattle Times be-
yond the parties to a suit requires a wholly different analysis. There may be
extreme situations in which a non-party obtains discovery material so explo-
sive-highly classified government documents, or even trade secrets-that
publication could be enjoined, or at least deferred. In that event, the stan-
dards applicable to such a non-party case would be those of the Pentagon
Papers case and not Seattle Times. Only if publication would do irreparable
harm, equivalent to revealing the itinerary of a troop ship about to sail in
time of war, would an injunction be warranted."' The interests that
uniquely justify intervention to protect the discovery process between parties
simply do not extend to a non-party such as Business Week in Procter &
Gamble.
Suppose, however, that the reporter obtained sealed documents by means
that were not only reprehensible, but unlawful as well. The issue of conduct
would then become central in a way that it was not in the actual Business
Week case. Yet, under proper First Amendment standards, bad conduct alone
would be insufficient justification for enjoining publication of accurate infor-
mation that was of strong interest to the public. That principle again seems
clear from the Pentagon Papers case, where the key documents had been
stolen, but where the media conduct seemed immaterial to the issue of prior
restraint.'1
2
That view was recently reaffirmed in CBS Inc. v. Davis."3 In Davis, a
meat-packer sought to enjoin a network broadcast that portrayed unsanitary
conditions in one of its plants."' The packer claimed that the damaging
footage had been obtained by persuading one of its employees to wear a
concealed camera."5 Thus, the packer claimed, the network could be
charged with trespass, breach of the employee's duty of loyalty, and viola-
"o See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33, 35 (1984).
"' See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
112 See id. at 714.
"3 114 S. Ct. 912 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
114 Id. at 913.
115 Id.
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tion of trade secret laws." 6 On that basis, a South Dakota trial court grant-
ed an injunction, and the state supreme court affirmed." 7 The network
sought Supreme Court relief, and on the following day Justice Blackmun
dissolved the injunction. 18
Although acknowledging what the lower courts had termed as CBS's
"calculated misdeeds," Blackmun insisted that "subsequent civil or criminal
proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanc-
tion ... in the First Amendment context."" 9 Thus, under the Pentagon
Papers standard, injunctive relief was unwarranted. Moreover, this recent
reaffirmation of the rigorous prior restraint doctrine seems to confirm that
conduct is not a valid basis for injunctive relief. Justice Blackmun's ruling
would thus seem at variance with Justice Stevens's comment in Procter &
Gamble, where he noted that "the manner in which [Business Week] came
into possession of the information it seeks to publish may have a bearing on
its right to do so.' ' 2°
Suppose the meat-packer had sought damages after the fact, rather than
seeking to bar the broadcast. If unlawful newsgathering conduct would not
justify a prior restraint, what of subsequent relief? Justice Blackmun's own
reference to the availability and appropriateness of post-broadcast reme-
dies' suggests at least some situations in which conduct would be action-
able despite the importance and the accuracy of the information. That pros-
pect brings us to the third and final case.
C. Food Lion: Unfriendly Cameras in the Freezer
The prospect of post-broadcast relief is precisely the issue in the ongo-
ing dispute between ABC and Food Lion.'22 To obtain footage of suspect
packaging and marketing practices at certain Food Lion stores, an ABC
employee sought and obtained a job at one of those stores. Equipped
with a hidden camera, she arranged to work alone late one night, and filmed
such activities as repacking and re-dating certain perishables, soaking old
fish in a bleach solution, and lathering meat with barbecue sauce to cover
evidence of spoilage. 1"' Although Food Lion filed suit against the network
before the broadcast,'20 it did not seek an injunction. A spokesman ex-
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 915.
119 Id. at 914.
120 McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6, 7 (Stevens, Circuit
Justice 1995).
121 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122 See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
123 Id. at 814.
124 Id. at 816.
125 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1992 U.S. Dist.
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plained that the company did not want to keep the story off the air; instead,
Food Lion sought to demonstrate that "an ABC producer broke the law in
order to concoct a story."'" Specifically, Food Lion cited several allegedly
unlawful elements-that the ABC producer had fraudulently gained employ-
ment by using an alias, and that to generate the damaging footage she delib-
erately manufactured a "mess" so as to film it.'27 The suit also alleged that
the broadcast cast aspersions on what were quite proper practices, such as
shipping vacuum-packed meat well within its shelf life."~ In separate
copyright proceedings, Food Lion asserted its right as the "employer" of the
photographer to the unused out-takes of the broadcast-footage which, it in-
sisted would corroborate its charges of distortion.'29
Food Lion may well yield clearer answers to some core questions about
newsgathering conduct. Undeniably, journalists are liable for tangible
wrongs they commit in the course of obtaining information.13 Thus, if the
ABC producer had damaged a freezer during the filming process, no First
Amendment defense would have barred Food Lion's suit for the cost of
repairs. Had she assaulted another worker to get a better picture, the net-
work would be fully liable for injuries. If a regular Food Lion employee
sought libel damages for ABC footage that unfairly implied she had violated
company policy or state food packaging laws, the First Amendment would
protect the network no more fully than in any other defamation suit by a
private plaintiff. 3'
These are not, however, the kinds of claims that Food Lion has in mind
or that ABC fears. Recovery for such wrongs would be modest and would
do nothing to vindicate the plaintiff or deter the defendant. The real issues
lie beyond this modest goal, and that are central to Food Lion's
suit-whether, if proven, a violation of state employment law on the ABC
producer's part, or clear acts of trespass, would give rise to damages.'
The guiding principles should by now be clear. On' the one hand, it
cannot be said that, in a subsequent civil suit, conduct never matters to the
issue of damages; such a view would imply that journalists are above the
law, not only with respect to the use of information, but also as to how they
WL 456652, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 1992).
126 Disinformation Campaign Against Food Lion Must Stop, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, PRNEWS File.
127 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 815-16.
12S Id.
129 See Jensen, supra note 11, at B6.
130 See Food Lion., 887 F. Supp. at 824. "The laws governing the remaining claims
are generally applicable laws which do not target the press. Holding ABC accountable
for any damages it allegedly caused Food Lion in violation of those laws would not
violate the First Amendment." Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 820.
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obtain it. To take the clearest case, if a reporter commits robbery or battery
to obtain a story, the newspaper or station may be able to use the story, but
both the reporter and the employer will be held accountable for the crimes
committed. On the other hand, the process of newsgathering is clearly dif-
ferent from activities unrelated to the First Amendment. Thus, the scope of
relief in such a case will depend on a careful consideration of various fac-
tors. Those factors should help to resolve a variety of difficult cases and
issues throughout this complex field. We turn now to a brief consideration
of those factors.
III. WHEN DOES CONDUCr MATTER AND How MUCH?-
PRELIMINARY GUIDING PRINCIPLES
(1) Bad conduct never justifies prior restraint. From the Pentagon Pa-
pers case through the recent case of the South Dakota meat-packer, the
Supreme Court has held consistently to the view that newsgathering conduct
by itself never justifies enjoining publication. The very few cases like Seat-
tle Times, which do uphold restraints, are not to the contrary, because they
do not turn on the conduct of the news organization, but on other dimen-
sions of the source of the information. Thus Justice Stevens incorrectly
implied that Business Week's newsgathering conduct "may have a bearing
on its right [to publish].' 33
(2) The accuracy of the information and the degree of public interest
bear significantly, along with conduct, on the issue of post-publication dam-
ages and other relief. In cases such as those brought by rape victims and
other persons who were promised confidentiality, media freedom from lia-
bility depends on the confluence of these three factors.
(3) Not all journalistic misconduct is of equal concern within this equa-
tion. Systemic and societal interests bear on the degree to which newsgath-
ering conduct warrants recourse after the fact. Thus, serious criminal law
violations would weigh more heavily against a media defendant than simple
trespass or misrepresentation, even if such misconduct might support some
form of civil redress.
(4) Purely private interests, individual or commercial, should not by
themselves be sufficient to support civil redress other than for direct physi-
cal injury or damage against unlawful or improper newsgathering; only if
there are societal or systemic concerns that transcend individual interests
would relief normally be warranted.
(5) The public interest in receiving accurate information about matters of
concern should always weigh in the journalist's or media's favor in such
3 See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6, 7 (Stevens, Circuit
Justice 1995).
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cases. Thus, the publication of such information, if not technically privi-
leged, creates some latitude in the equation.
(6) The availability and adequacy of alternatives should always weigh in
the balance-most clearly in regard to pre-publication restraint, where post-
publication options would govern as a matter of law, but also in post-publi-
cation proceedings.
(7) The concept of journalistic misconduct should be refined and extend-
ed to newsgathering in electronic and digital form. Consideration should
now be given to the computer equivalents of physical theft and break-in
which represent traditional but increasingly unfamiliar forms of media trans-
gression.
